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In [1] Spangler characterizes Fogelin's definition of "argu-
ment" in [2] as being non-teleological and claims that such a 
definition will not work for a course in informal logic. Spangler 
says: "The idea of an argument as a series of statements 'con-
nected' in various ways leaves out of the story of argumenta-
tion its most important character, viz., the arguer and his pur-
poses." (p. 29) What bothers me about Fogelin's discussion is 
that he does not leave the arguer out of his understanding of 
arguments. Indeed, he treats arguments and parts of 
arguments as if they were arguers. Fogelin says: "Sometimes 
the primary intention of an argument is not to establish some 
truth, but rather to criticize or refute an argument presented 
by another." (p. 103) And he says: " ... they [the warranting 
connectives, such as 'since' and 'so'] present one or more 
statements as the warrant or backing for some other state-
ment." (p. 39) Fogelin gives conflicting accounts of what an 
argument is. For him, arguments are both passive en-
tities-series of statements connected in various ways-and 
active entitites that intend and have parts that present. 
The natural response that Fogelin might make to the 
above charge of inconsistency is that his talk about arguments 
as having intentions is not to be taken literally. How boring it 
would be if we could not jazz up our talk and speak as if the 
lifeless had life! But this response seems weak to me. Granted, 
people who know cars may, with benefit, whimsically 
describe their cars as feeling ill and as wanting to go to the 
doctor. But would it be wise to talk in this way to someone 
who needs to know, but does not know, what a car is? No. 
And our students need to recognize arguments, but too few of 
them can do so. 
My view is that arguments are passive, and I construe talk 
about arguments in this way. So, when I read the following 
passage I do not think that the author is saying that arguments 
have misconceptions, but that Holzman does. " ... Professor 
Holzman suggests that all Soviet military forces allocated to the 
Far East should be excluded from comparisons of NATO-
Warsaw Pact military expenditures, since these forces are "ir-
relevant to the superpower confrontation.' There are three 
misconceptions in this argument: ... " (Atlantic (Nov. '83), p. 7) 
The argument is that "all Soviet military ... expenditures, 
since these forces ... confrontation." And it is by this osten-
sive method of definition that I think we can have the most 
success in helping our students recognize arguments. It may 
be tempting to define "argument" as an ordered pair whose 
first member is a set of propositions and whose second 
member is a proposition, but the temptation should be 
resisted. The basic skills that we would like our students to ac-
quire can be acquired without entering into a discussion of 
realist definitions and their nominalist competitors. 
Suppose we adopt this metaphysically neutral means of 
defining "argument". There is an objection that I think 
Spangler has in mind: "If that A since Bis an argument then it 
could be the case that that A since B is also an explanation. 
Suppose, for example, that Holzman thinks that his audience 
believes that all Soviet military ... expenditures. Then 
Holzman's explanation is that A since B. But arguments can-
not be explanations. So we are wrong in identifying 
Holzman's argument." My response to this objection is that 
arguments can be explanations. It is arguing that cannot be ex-
plaining. We say that A is arguing for B if A is trying to per-
suade C to believe that B by asserting that 0, where A thinks 
that C does not believe that B. And we say that A is explaining 
that B if A asserts that D in order to help C see that B fits (or 
makes sense), where A thinks that C believes that B. Argumenta-
tion consists of activities of arguing and arguments. So 
Spangler is right in saying that we cannot exclude the arguer 
and his purposes from the study of argumentation. But he is 
wrong in saying that we cannot exclude the arguer and his 
purposes from the study of argument. 
But is it not odd to say that arguing is different from ex-
plaining and to say that an argument may be an explanation? I 
do not think so. We say that the lawyer's activity of pleading 
for the defendant's life is different from the victim's activity of 
cursing the defendant. Yet the lawyer's plea might be the 
victim's curse: that he is mentally deficient. 
When we try to avoid complicating our discussion of 
argumentation by restricting our attention to arguments, it is 
inevitable that we will be forced into the inconsistent position 
of making arguments both passive and active. The troubles 
with the deductive-inductive distinction are also due to mak-
ing arguments bear too much weight, as I noted in [3]. The ac-
tivity of arguing is where the deductive-inductive distinction 
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Teaching Informal Logic in High School 
Pamela Courtenay Hall 
I'm a high school teacher with a background in 
philosophy, so it didn't take much to convince me of the 
usefulness of getting informal logic into the high school cur-
riculum. But a recent experience has brought me from think-
ing "useful" to thinking "essential to the goals of education", 
and I'm in earnest now about wanting to see the development 
take place soon. Here's what happened. 
I was asked to fill in for a history teacher-a grade 9 lesson 
on "The advent of Communism in Europe". Points to be 
covered were "Russia at the end of WWI; the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty; Kerensky; Marx and his philosophy; the Revolution". 
A hefty task! But there were complications on top of it: the 
outline promised by my instructions was nowhere to be 
found; all of the textbooks were being used by another class; I 
had 15 minutes' notice, and the period was 75 minutes long. 
Informal Logic to the rescue! Here's how: (1) I involved the 
students in an attempt to define "communism'', 
"totalitarianism", "socialism", "capitalism", "democracy", 
etc. (no dictionary in the room!), pointing out the differences 
between the concepts, and the difficulties involved, including 
those which a dictionary would not solve, in trying to give 
adequate definitions. (2) I read from a 1963 textbook (the only 
thing available) on the topic "Russia today" -the American 
perspective circa 1956-and asked the students to identify any 
distortion or selection that they npticed. (Much initial explana-
tion required.) (3) We discussed how one might argue for 
communism and how one might argue against it, both from 
the perspective of a well-off Canadian student and from the 
possible perspective of a young person living in poverty. 
(4) We considered key terms in Marx's idea that human beings 
are conditioned by the economic situation they are born into, 
and we discussed whether these key terms were clear or 
vague in some troublesome way. We also discussed whether 
the idea operated on a full or partial consideration of what is 
important in a person's life. 
It was fun for me, and the learning was evident in their 
comments and in their faces. The students found reasoning a 
real break from just copying notes off the board. (Yes, in spite 
of awareness of other methods and the many resources 
available, the old (easy) rote ways are still used exclusively by 
some teachers.) Of course, what they learned that day was not 
"history": by the end of class, the students had learned only a 
few of the details of "The Advent of Communism in Russia". 
But given the unusual absence of textbooks and teaching 
materials, they learned more than could be expected, both of 
the historical details and, more importantly, of how one might 
connect with them. 
